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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
  Kristie Bell and Joan Luppe are the named plaintiffs 
in a class action complaint (the “Complaint”) filed against 
Cheswick Generating Station, GenOn Power Midwest, L.P. 
(“GenOn”).1  The putative class (the “Class”) is made up of at 
least 1,500 individuals who own or inhabit residential 
property within one mile of GenOn’s Cheswick Generating 
Station, a 570-megawatt coal-fired electrical generation 
facility in Springdale, Pennsylvania (the “Plant”).   
 
Complaining of ash and contaminants settling on their 
property, the Class brought suit against GenOn under several 
state law tort theories.  GenOn argued that because the Plant 
                                              
1
 The Complaint was filed in April 2012 in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.  GenOn 
is a limited partnership organized under the laws of Delaware 
with its organizational headquarters and principal place of 
business in Houston, Texas.  According to GenOn, 
“Cheswick Generating Station, GenOn Power Midwest, L.P.” 
is not a legal entity.  However, GenOn admits that it operates 
the Cheswick Generating Station.  See Bell v. Cheswick 
Generating Station, 903 F. Supp. 2d 314, 314 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 
2012).  The error in the caption does not affect our ruling in 
any way.   
4 
was subject to comprehensive regulation under the Clean Air 
Act, it owed no extra duty to the members of the Class under 
state tort law.  The District Court agreed with GenOn and 
dismissed the case.  On appeal, we are faced with a matter of 
first impression: whether the Clean Air Act preempts state 
law tort claims brought by private property owners against a 
source of pollution located within the state.  Based on the 
plain language of the Clean Air Act and controlling Supreme 
Court precedent, we conclude that such source state common 
law actions are not preempted.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
decision of the District Court and remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
 
I. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
A. Environmental Regulation Under the Clean Air Act 
 
 The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq., enacted 
in 1970, is a comprehensive federal law that regulates air 
emissions under the auspices of the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).  Congress 
enacted the law in response to evidence of the increasing 
amount of air pollution created by the industrialization and 
urbanization of the United States and its threat to public 
health and welfare.  42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2).  The Clean Air 
Act states that air pollution prevention and control is the 
primary responsibility of individual states and local 
governments but that federal financial assistance and 
leadership is essential to accomplish these goals.  Id. 
§ 7401(a)(3)-(4).  Thus, it employs a “cooperative 
federalism” structure under which the federal government 
develops baseline standards that the states individually 
implement and enforce.  GenOn Rema, LLC v. EPA, No. 12-
5 
1022, 2013 WL 3481486, at *1 (3d Cir. July 12, 2013).  In so 
doing, states are expressly allowed to employ standards more 
stringent than those specified by the federal requirements.  42 
U.S.C. § 7416. 
 
The Clean Air Act makes the EPA responsible for 
developing acceptable national ambient air quality standards 
(“NAAQS”), which are meant to set a uniform level of air 
quality across the country in order to protect the populace and 
the environment.  Id. § 7409(b)(1).  Before such levels are 
adopted or modified by the EPA, “a reasonable time for 
interested persons to submit written comments” must be 
provided.  Id. § 7409(a)(1)(B).  The EPA itself does not 
typically regulate individual sources of emissions.  Instead, 
decisions regarding how to meet NAAQS are left to 
individual states.  Id. § 7410(a)(1).  Pursuant to this goal, each 
state is required to create and submit to the EPA a State 
Implementation Plan (“SIP”) which provides for 
implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of NAAQS 
within the state.  Id.  All SIPs must be submitted to the EPA 
for approval before they become final, and once a SIP is 
approved, “its requirements become federal law and are fully 
enforceable in federal court.” Her Majesty the Queen in Right 
of the Province of Ontario v. Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 335 (6th 
Cir. 1989) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)). 
 
States are tasked with enforcing the limitations they 
adopt in their SIPs.  They must regulate all stationary sources 
located within the areas covered by the SIPs, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7410(a)(2)(C), and implement a mandatory permit program 
that limits the amounts and types of emissions that each 
stationary source is allowed to discharge, id. §§ 7661a(d)(1), 
7661c(a).  “[E]ach permit is intended to be a source-specific 
6 
bible for Clean Air Act compliance containing in a single, 
comprehensive set of documents, all [Clean Air Act] 
requirements relevant to the particular polluting source.”  
North Carolina, ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 
F.3d 291, 300 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Furthermore, pursuant to the federal Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration of Air Quality program in areas 
attaining NAAQS, “a covered source must, among other 
things, install the ‘best available control technology [] for 
each pollutant subject to regulation . . . .’” Coalition for 
Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 133 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §7475(a)(4)). 
 
B. Modes of Redress Under the CAA 
 
The Clean Air Act contains a “citizen suit” provision, 
see 42 U.S.C. § 7604, which permits the filing of civil suits in 
district courts “against any person . . . who is alleged to have 
violated . . . or to be in violation of (A) an emission standard 
or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the 
Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or 
limitation.”  Id. § 7604(a)(1).  The statute further grants a 
cause of action against the EPA if it fails to perform any non-
discretionary responsibility, id. § 7604(a)(2), and also allows 
suit against any entity that constructs a source of emissions 
without securing the requisite permits.  Id. § 7604(a)(3).   
Furthermore, the EPA “retains the power to inspect and 
monitor regulated sources, to impose administrative penalties 
for noncompliance, and to commence civil actions against 
polluters in federal court.”  Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. 
Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2011).  
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The citizen suit provision contains a “savings clause” 
which provides, in pertinent part: 
 
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right 
which any person (or class of persons) may 
have under any statute or common law to seek 
enforcement of any emission standard or 
limitation or to seek any other relief (including 
relief against the Administrator or a State 
agency). 
 
42 U.S.C. § 7604(e).  This is the Clean Air Act’s “citizen suit 
savings clause.” 
 
The Clean Air Act also contains a separate savings 
clause entitled “Retention of State authority,” codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 7416.  This provision focuses on states’ rights, and 
reads as follows: 
 
Except as otherwise provided . . . nothing in this 
chapter shall preclude or deny the right of any 
State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or 
enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting 
emissions of air pollutants or (2) any 
requirement respecting control or abatement of 
air pollution . . . . 
 
Id. § 7416.  This is the Clean Air Act’s “states’ rights savings 
clause.” 
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C. Regulation at the Cheswick Plant 
 
Federal, state, and local authorities extensively 
regulate and comprehensively oversee the operations of the 
Cheswick Plant pursuant to their authority under the Clean 
Air Act.  The EPA, the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection, and the Allegheny County Health 
Department comprise the administrative bodies that are 
primarily responsible for defining environmental emission 
standards and policing compliance with the Clean Air Act at 
the Plant.  As discussed above, at the EPA’s direction and 
with its approval, states issue operating permits for all 
stationary sources under Subchapter V of the Clean Air Act.  
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661a-f.  Subchapter V program authority 
has in this instance been delegated to Allegheny County.  
GenOn’s Subchapter V permit for Cheswick (the “Permit”) 
imposes limits on the emission of various particulate matter, 
gasses, chemical, and compounds from coal combustion.  See 
App. 91-161. 
   
The Permit collects all the operational requirements 
that are contained in Subchapter V of the Clean Air Act, and 
approved by the EPA.  It specifically provides that GenOn 
may not “operate . . . any source in such manner that 
emissions of malodorous matter from such source are 
perceptible beyond the property line,” App. 106 (§ IV.3); 
must “take all reasonable actions to prevent fugitive air 
contaminants from becoming airborne,” App. 112 (§ IV.19); 
may not “conduct . . . any materials handling operation in 
such manner that emissions from such operation are visible at 
or beyond the property line,” App. 106 (§ IV.4); must ensure 
that “[a]ll air pollution control equipment” is “properly 
installed, maintained, and operated,” App. 106 (§ IV.5); and 
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may not “operate any source . . . in such manner that 
emissions from such source . . . [m]ay reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger the public health, safety, or welfare.”  
App. 96 (§ III.1).   
 
However, it also provides that “nothing in this permit 
relieves the permittee from the obligation to comply with all 
applicable Federal, State and Local Laws and regulations,” 
App. 96 (Declaration of Policy), and contains a savings clause 
which provides that: 
 
Nothing in this permit shall be construed as 
impairing any right or remedy now existing or 
hereafter created in equity, common law or 
statutory law with respect to air pollution, nor 
shall any court be deprived of such jurisdiction 
for the reason that such air pollution constitutes 
a violation of this permit. 
 
App. 102 (§ III.31). 
 
II. GENERAL FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 
OVERVIEW 
 
A. The Complaint
2
 
 
The Complaint alleges that GenOn’s operation, 
maintenance, control, and use of the Plant releases 
                                              
2
 The following factual allegations are taken from the 
Complaint, and we accept them as true for the purposes of 
this appeal. 
10 
malodorous substances and particulates
3
 into the surrounding 
neighborhood, causing fly ash and unburned coal combustion 
byproducts to settle onto the Class members’ property as a 
“black dust/film . . . or white powder” which requires 
constant cleaning.  App. 9.  These odors and particulates are 
harmful and noxious and have caused substantial damage to 
Class members’ property and the loss of their ability to use 
and enjoy their properties, making them “prisoners in their 
[own] homes.”  App. 12.  The operation of the Plant has been 
the subject of numerous and constant complaints by the 
residents of the surrounding neighborhood and by 
organizations and interested persons within the area.  
However, these complaints have not compelled GenOn to 
cease the improper operation of the Plant or to discontinue the 
ongoing invasion and trespass of the Class members’ 
properties.  The Complaint alleges that GenOn knows of the 
“improper construction, and operation of the [Plant], which 
allows discharge” of these particulates, yet “continues to 
operate the [Plant] without proper or best available 
technology, or any proper air pollution control equipment.”  
App. 12-13.   
 
Based on these allegations, the Class seeks to recover 
compensatory and punitive damages under three state 
common law tort theories: (1) nuisance; (2) negligence and 
                                              
3
 These particulates include arsenic compounds, barium 
compounds, chromium compounds, copper compounds, 
dioxin and dioxin-like compounds, hydrochloric acid, 
hydrogen fluoride, lead compounds, manganese compounds, 
mercury compounds, nickel compounds, polycyclic aromatic 
compounds, sulfuric acid, vanadium compounds, and zinc 
compounds.  App. 10-11. 
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recklessness; and (3) trespass.
4
  Although the Complaint also 
seeks injunctive relief on the nuisance and trespass counts, 
the Class admits that such relief would be limited to an order 
requiring GenOn to remove the particulate that continuously 
falls upon the Class members’ properties.  Oral Arg. at 13:50; 
Bell, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 318. 
 
B. The District Court Decision 
 
In July 2012, GenOn removed the case to the Western 
District of Pennsylvania invoking the District Court’s 
diversity jurisdiction, and promptly moved to dismiss the 
action on the grounds that the state law tort claims were 
preempted by the Clean Air Act.  It argued that allowing such 
claims to go forward “would undermine the [Clean Air Act]’s 
comprehensive scheme, and make it impossible for regulators 
to strike their desired balance in implementing emissions 
standards.”  App. 84.  In October 2012 the District Court 
granted GenOn’s motion, finding that the Clean Air Act 
preempted all of the Class’s state law claims. 
   
The District Court began by summarizing the 
extensive regulatory framework governing the Plant.  It then 
reviewed the Complaint and determined that “the allegations 
of Plaintiffs, as pleaded, assert various permit violations and 
seek a judicial examination of matters governed by the 
regulating administrative bodies.”  Bell, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 
320.  Thus, it moved on to examine “whether the Clean Air 
Act preempts the state common law claims or whether the 
                                              
4
 The Class also asserted a strict liability claim, but has 
conceded that it must fail because power generation is not an 
ultra-hazardous activity.  See Bell, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 317. 
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savings clause in the citizen suit provision allow those claims 
to survive.”  Id. at 321.  After discussing the relevant case 
law, the District Court concluded that, “[b]ased on the 
extensive and comprehensive regulations promulgated by the 
administrative bodies which govern air emissions from 
electrical generation facilities, the Court finds and rules that 
to permit the common law claims would be inconsistent with 
the dictates of the Clean Air Act.”  Id. at 322.  The Court 
found that the “savings clause of the Clean Air Act does not 
alter this analysis.”  Id.  The Class now appeals this decision. 
 
III. DISCUSSION
5
 
 
A. Preemption Analysis 
 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution states: 
 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof 
. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and 
the Judges in every State shall be bound 
                                              
5
 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  In reviewing a motion to dismiss, we must 
accept as true all well-pleaded facts and allegations, and must 
draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the 
plaintiff.  Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008).  
A district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss is given 
plenary review.  Grier v. Klem, 591 F.3d 672, 676 (3d Cir. 
2010).   
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thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws 
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
 
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  The Supreme Court has interpreted 
the Supremacy Clause as preempting any state law that 
“interferes with or is contrary to federal law.”  Free v. Bland, 
369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962).  “Federal law can preempt state 
law in three ways: (1) express preemption, (2) field 
preemption, and (3) conflict preemption.”  Farina v. Nokia, 
625 F.3d 97, 115 (3d Cir. 2010).  “Conflict preemption 
nullifies state law inasmuch as it conflicts with federal law, 
either where compliance with both laws is impossible or 
where state law erects an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  GenOn argues that 
state tort law conflicts with the objectives of the Clean Air 
Act, because it “would undermine the [Act]’s comprehensive 
scheme and rival the work of regulators as they strike their 
desired balance in implementing emissions standards.”  
Appellee Br. at 26.   
 
 1. Legal Precedent 
 
 While the extent to which the Clean Air Act preempts 
state law tort claims against an in-state source of pollution is a 
matter of first impression in this Circuit, the Supreme Court 
has addressed this issue in the context of a similarly 
comprehensive environmental statute: the Clean Water Act, 
33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq.  In International Paper Co. v. 
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987), the Court was asked to 
determine whether the Clean Water Act preempted a Vermont 
common law nuisance suit filed in Vermont state court, where 
the source of the alleged injury was located in New York.  
14 
Plaintiffs, a group of property owners who resided on the 
Vermont (“affected state”) shore of Lake Champlain, alleged 
that the defendant paper company, which operated a pulp and 
paper mill on the New York (“source state”) side of the lake, 
was discharging “effluents” into the lake, polluting the water 
and thereby diminishing the value of their property.  Id. at 
484.  Defendants argued that the Clean Water Act preempted 
the court from applying Vermont state law against a source of 
pollution located in New York.  In response, Plaintiffs argued 
that the Clean Water Act’s savings clauses indicated “that 
Congress intended to preserve the right to bring suit under the 
law of any affected State.”  Id. at 493. 
 
Like the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act contains 
two savings clauses, one located in the citizen suit provision, 
and another which focuses on states’ rights.  Section § 505(e) 
of the Clean Water Act, which is located in the Act’s citizen 
suit provision, states: 
 
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right 
which any person (or class of persons) may 
have under any statute or common law to seek 
enforcement of any effluent standard or 
limitation or to seek any other relief . . . .   
 
33 U.S.C. § 1365(e).  Section 510 of the Clean Water Act 
focuses on states’ rights, and provides: 
 
Except as expressly provided in this chapter, 
nothing in this chapter shall (1) preclude or 
deny the right of any State or political 
subdivision thereof or interstate agency to adopt 
or enforce (A) any standard or limitation 
15 
respecting discharges of pollutants, or (B) any 
requirement respecting control or abatement of 
pollution; . . . or (2) be construed as impairing 
or in any manner affecting any right or 
jurisdiction of the States with respect to the 
waters (including boundary waters) of such 
States. 
 
Id. § 1370.   
 
The Ouellette Court found that the Clean Water Act’s 
savings clauses clearly preserved some state law tort actions, 
but that the text of the clauses did not provide a definitive 
answer to the question of whether suits based on the law of 
the affected state were preempted.  479 U.S. at 492, 497.  
However, it found definitively that “nothing in the [Clean 
Water Act] bars aggrieved individuals from bringing a 
nuisance claim pursuant to the laws of the source State.”  Id. 
at 497 (emphasis in original).  The Court reasoned that, “[b]y 
its terms the Clean Water Act allows States . . . to impose 
higher standards on their own point sources,” and “this 
authority may include the right to impose higher common-law 
as well as higher statutory restrictions.”  Id. (internal citation 
omitted).  The Court acknowledged that a source state’s 
“nuisance law may impose separate standards and thus create 
some tension with the permit system,” but explained that this 
“would not frustrate the goals of the Clean Water Act,” 
because “a source only is required to look to a single 
additional authority, whose rules should be relatively 
predictable.”  Id. at 498-99.6  Thus, a suit by Vermont citizens 
                                              
6
 Ultimately, the Ouellette Court concluded that “the [Clean 
Water Act] precludes a court from applying the law of an 
16 
would not be preempted if brought under the law of New 
York, the source state. 
 
GenOn argues that Ouellette is distinguishable from 
this case because the savings clauses of the Clean Water Act 
are broader than the corresponding provisions in the Clean 
Air Act.  However, a textual comparison of the two savings 
clauses at issue demonstrates there is no meaningful 
difference between them.   
 
As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, and GenOn 
concedes, the citizen suit savings clause of the Clean Water 
Act is “virtually identical” to its counterpart in the Clean Air 
Act.  City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 
328 (1981); Appellee Br. at 30.  Thus, GenOn’s argument 
hinges on its expansive reading of the Clean Water Act’s 
states’ rights savings clause, which again provides: 
 
Except as expressly provided in this chapter, 
nothing in this chapter shall (1) preclude or 
deny the right of any State or political 
subdivision thereof or interstate agency to adopt 
or enforce (A) any standard or limitation 
respecting discharges of pollutants, or (B) any 
requirement respecting control or abatement of 
pollution; . . . or (2) be construed as impairing 
                                                                                                     
affected State against an out-of-state source,” id. at 494, 
reasoning that if “affected States were allowed to impose 
separate discharge standards on a single [out-of-state] point 
source, the inevitable result would be a serious interference 
with the achievement of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress,” id. at 493 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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or in any manner affecting any right or 
jurisdiction of the States with respect to the 
waters (including boundary waters) of such 
States. 
 
33 U.S.C. § 1370 (emphasis added).  By way of comparison, 
the states’ rights savings clause of the Clean Air Act 
provides: 
 
Except as otherwise provided . . . nothing in this 
chapter shall preclude or deny the right of any 
State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or 
enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting 
emissions of air pollutants or (2) any 
requirement respecting control or abatement of 
air pollution . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. § 7416.  As a side-by-side comparison of the text 
indicates, the only meaningful difference between the two 
states’ rights savings clauses is the portion of the Clean Water 
Act italicized above which refers to the boundary waters of 
the states.  The reason why such language is not included the 
in Clean Air Act is clear: there are no such jurisdictional 
boundaries or rights which apply to the air.  If anything, the 
absence of any language regarding state boundaries in the 
states’ rights savings clause of the Clean Air Act indicates 
that Congress intended to preserve more rights for the states, 
rather than less.  In no way can this omission be read to 
preempt all state law tort claims. 
 
 The only other circuit courts to have examined this 
issue in depth have also found no meaningful distinction 
between the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act.  In Her 
18 
Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario v. 
Detroit, 874 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1989), the Sixth Circuit held 
that the Clean Air Act did not preempt plaintiffs from suing 
the City of Detroit under the Michigan Environmental 
Protection Act (“MEPA”), finding that “the [Clean Air Act] 
displaces state law only to the extent that state law is not as 
strict as emission limitations established in the federal 
statute.”  Id. at 342 (emphasis removed from original).  The 
court reasoned that “the plain language of the [Clean Air 
Act’s] savings clause . . . clearly indicates that Congress did 
not wish to abolish state control,” id. at 342-43, and, relying 
on Ouellette, concluded: 
 
If the plaintiffs succeed in state court, it will 
simply be an instance where a state is enacting 
and enforcing more stringent pollution controls 
as authorized by the [Clean Air Act].  With 
MEPA, the State of Michigan has created a 
mechanism under which more stringent 
limitations may be imposed than required by 
federal law.  It is, by its terms, supplemental to 
other legal and administrative procedures and 
requirements, and in this case principles of 
comity and federalism require us to hold these 
MEPA actions are not preempted by federal 
law. 
 
Id. at 344. 
 
In North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley 
Authority, 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010), the state of North 
Carolina brought a state law public nuisance suit against the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”), a federal agency which 
19 
owned and operated eleven coal-fired power plants located in 
Tennessee, Alabama, and Kentucky.  After a bench trial, the 
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina 
issued an injunction against four of the TVA plants, imposing 
emission standards on the plants that were stricter than what 
was required by the Clean Air Act.  On appeal, the Fourth 
Circuit reversed, finding that the district court had incorrectly 
applied the law of the affected state in violation of Ouellette, 
and that the TVA plants’ emissions were not a public 
nuisance under the laws of the source states.  In explaining its 
decision to apply Ouellette, the court noted that the savings 
clauses of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act are 
“similar.”  Id. at 304.  It also noted that the Clean Water Act 
is “similarly comprehensive” to the Clean Air Act, and that 
“[w]hile Ouellette involved a nuisance suit against a source 
regulated under the Clean Water Act, all parties agree its 
holding is equally applicable to the Clean Air Act.”  Id. at 
306. 
 
Ultimately, as commentators have recognized, “there 
is little basis for distinguishing the Clean Air Act from the 
Clean Water Act—the two statutes feature nearly identical 
savings clauses and employ similar ‘cooperative federalism’ 
structures.”  Scott Gallisdorfer, Note, Clean Air Act 
Preemption of State Common Law: Greenhouse Gas 
Nuisance Claims After AEP v. Connecticut, 99 Va. L. Rev. 
131, 150 (2013).  Both Acts establish a regulatory scheme 
through which source states, and not affected states, play the 
primary role in developing the regulations by which a 
particular source will be bound.  Both Acts contain citizen 
suit provisions which allow individuals to bring suit to 
enforce their terms under certain circumstances, and both 
Acts contain two savings clauses: one located within the 
20 
citizen suit provision which focuses on the rights of 
individuals to sue, and a second independent savings clause 
which focuses on states’ rights. 
 
Given that we find no meaningful difference between 
the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act for the purposes 
of our preemption analysis, we conclude that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ouellette controls this case, and thus, the 
Clean Air Act does not preempt state common law claims 
based on the law of the state where the source of the pollution 
is located.
7
  Accordingly, the suit here, brought by 
Pennsylvania residents under Pennsylvania law against a 
source of pollution located in Pennsylvania, is not preempted.  
 
2. Public Policy Considerations 
 
GenOn argues that our holding may undermine the 
comprehensive regulatory structure established by the Clean 
                                              
7
 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in American Electric 
Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011), does 
nothing to alter our analysis.  There, the Court held that the 
Clean Air Act displaced any federal common law right to 
seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from power 
plants.  Id. at 2537.  However, the Court acknowledged that 
“[l]egislative displacement of federal common law does not 
require the same sort of evidence of clear and manifest 
[congressional] purpose demanded for preemption of state 
law,” and explicitly left open the question of whether the 
Clean Air Act preempted state law.  Id. at 2537, 2540; see 
Gallisdorfer, 99 Va. L. Rev. at 139 (“the displacement finding 
in [American Electric] hardly compels—or even presages—a 
corresponding finding of preemption”). 
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Air Act by allowing the jury and the court to set emissions 
standards.  Furthermore, amicus Utility Air Regulatory Group 
(“UARG”) argues that allowing such cases to move forward 
would open the proverbial floodgates to nuisance claims 
against sources in full compliance with federal and state 
environmental standards, creating a patchwork of inconsistent 
standards across the country that would compromise 
Congress’s carefully constructed cooperative federalism 
framework.  Such inconsistency, it argues, would make it 
extremely difficult for sources to plan and operate, as they 
would never be sure of precisely what standards apply to their 
operations.  
 
However, “[t]he Supreme Court addressed this precise 
problem” in Ouellette, Cooper, 615 F.3d at 301, and rejected 
the very same concerns that GenOn and UARG now raise. 
Indeed, while the Ouellette Court acknowledged that allowing 
“a number of different states to have independent and plenary 
regulatory authority over a single discharge would lead to 
chaotic confrontation between sovereign states,” 479 U.S. at 
496-97 (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 
414 (7th Cir. 1984)), it found that “[a]n action brought . . . 
under [source state] nuisance law would not frustrate the 
goals of the [Clean Water Act] as would a suit governed by 
[affected state] law,” id. at 498.  Its reasoning was 
straightforward: 
 
First, application of the source State’s law does 
not disturb the balance among federal, source-
state, and affected-state interests. Because the 
Act specifically allows source States to impose 
stricter standards, the imposition of source-state 
law does not disrupt the regulatory partnership 
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established by the permit system.  Second, the 
restriction of suits to those brought under 
source-state nuisance law prevents a source 
from being subject to an indeterminate number 
of potential regulations. Although [source state] 
nuisance law may impose separate standards 
and thus create some tension with the permit 
system, a source only is required to look to a 
single additional authority, whose rules should 
be relatively predictable. Moreover, States can 
be expected to take into account their own 
nuisance laws in setting permit requirements. 
 
Id. at 498-99.   
 
Thus, the Court recognized that the requirements 
placed on sources of pollution through the “cooperative 
federalism” structure of the Clean Water Act served as a 
regulatory floor, not a ceiling, and expressly held that states 
are free to impose higher standards on their own sources of 
pollution, and that state tort law is a permissible way of doing 
so.  Id. at 497-98.  Indeed, courts in other circuits have 
affirmed decisions granting plaintiffs relief against sources of 
air pollution under state law nuisance theory.  See e.g., Ellis v. 
Gallatin Steel Co., 390 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding 
award of injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive 
damages for violation of Kentucky nuisance law where 
“fugitive dust” from defendant’s steel plant settled on 
plaintiffs’ property). 
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B. Political Question Doctrine 
 
GenOn argues in the alternative that the Class’s claims 
should be barred by the political question doctrine based on 
the existence of the Clean Air Act.  “The political question 
doctrine excludes from judicial review those controversies 
which revolve around policy choices and value 
determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to 
the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive 
Branch.”  Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc., 478 
U.S. 221, 230 (1986).  No court has ever held that such a 
constitutional commitment of authority regarding the redress 
of individual property rights for pollution exists in the 
legislative branch.  Indeed, if such a commitment did exist, 
the Supreme Court would not have decided Ouellette in the 
first place.  Accordingly, we reject this argument. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
“In all pre-emption cases . . . we start with the 
assumption that the . . . powers of the States were not to be 
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress.”  Medtronic, Inc., v. Lohr, 518 
U.S. 470, 485 (1996).  We see nothing in the Clean Air Act to 
indicate that Congress intended to preempt source state 
common law tort claims.  If Congress intended to eliminate 
such private causes of action, “its failure even to hint at” this 
result would be “spectacularly odd.”  Id. at 491.  The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ouellette confirms this reading 
of the statute.  Accordingly, we hold that the Class’s claims 
are not preempted.  We will reverse the decision of the 
District Court and remand this case for further proceedings. 
